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OVER THE BORDERLINE:  
A CRITICAL INQUIRY INTO THE GEOGRAPHY OF 
TERRITORIAL EXCISION AND THE SECURITISATION OF 




I    INTRODUCTION 
The policy of territorial excision is a foundational and extraordinary aspect of 
Australian refugee and immigration policy. First introduced in Australia over 14 
years ago in 2001 as part of a package of immigration reforms following the 
September 11 attacks in the United States, it essentially designates certain parts 
of Australian territory to be ‘excised’ from Australia’s migration zone.1 As a 
result of the policy, any person who reaches an ‘excised offshore place’ by sea 
without authorisation is classified as an ‘unauthorised maritime arrival’. 2 
Unauthorised maritime arrivals are held to be outside Australia’s migration zone 
and may not apply for a visa under Australia’s existing onshore visa application 
process, as set out in the Migration Act.3 
Up until May 2013 the policy applied to an arc of Australia’s 4891 outlying 
islands and territories, mainly situated across the northern half of the continent. 
However, in 2013 it was expanded to include the entire Australian mainland.4 As 
a result of the reform, an ‘unlawful non-citizen’ entering Australian territory ‘at 
any place’ by sea is designated as an ‘unauthorised maritime arrival’ and as a 
                                                 
* Quentin Bryce Teaching Fellow and doctoral scholar at the Faculty of Law, University of Technology, 
Sydney, co-enrolled with the University of British Columbia.  
The author would like to warmly thank Jenni Millbank, Honni van Rijswijk, Jemima Mowbray and 
Robert Leckey for their generous feedback and comments on earlier versions of this piece. Parts of this 
article were drawn from research undertaken in completion of an LLM by Research at the McGill 
University Faculty of Law. 
1 ‘Migration zone’ is defined as ‘the area consisting of the States, the Territories, Australian resource 
installations and Australian sea installations’: Migration Act 1958 (Cth) s 5(1) (definition of ‘migration 
zone’) (‘Migration Act’). 
2 Migration Act s 5AA(1). 
3 Migration Act s 46A(1). Although ‘unauthorised maritime arrival’ is the current statutory designation as 
at 2015, I refer to those travelling by boat to seek residence in Australia in a number of ways, including as 
onshore asylum seekers, ‘irregularly’ documented arrivals and unauthorised arrivals. While all of these 
categories are inadequate, as they are homogenising and often defined from the perspective of the state, I 
switch between them and seek to avoid categorising all irregularly documented migrants as necessarily 
intending to seek asylum. 
4 Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 2013 (Cth) sch 1 item 
8, inserting Migration Act s 5AA. 
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consequence, may not make an application for asylum in Australia or for an 
Australian visa of any kind.5 This final expansion of the policy came after a 
previous federal government’s failed attempt to excise the Australian mainland 
from the migration zone in 2006.6 On both occasions, ‘excising’ Australia from 
its own migration zone attracted significant national and international attention as 
a novel means by which to limit irregular migrants’ access to Australia’s legal 
system when seeking asylum. 
The original policy of territorial excision was established in tandem with a 
regime entailing that asylum seekers arriving by boat on excised Australian 
islands could be sent ‘offshore’, to countries other than Australia, in order to 
process their claims for refugee protection. While there has been voluminous 
debate and discussion about the legality of and motivations for the removal of 
asylum seekers to third countries in the Pacific under what has become known as 
the ‘Pacific Solution’,7 remarkably little attention has been paid to the history, 
logic and significance of territorial excision. This is the case despite the 
progressive expansion of excision, and its centrality in a regime that seeks to 
control and deter ‘unauthorised’ boat arrivals. The policy has remained in place 
in the context of enormously frenetic shifts in Australian migration and refugee 
policy. Although the consequences and effects of arriving on territorially excised 
places have been repeatedly modified since excision’s inception in 2001, the 
policy has persisted despite four federal elections and two changes of 
government, and both major Australian political parties continue to support it. 
As such, excision’s centrality and endurance in Australia’s migration law and 
policy landscape merits close consideration. Excision is frequently described in 
passing, as a building block in a policy package that aims to limit the access of 
onshore asylum seekers to Australian territory and to Australia’s onshore refugee 
                                                 
5 Ibid. 
6 Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (Cth). See also Department of 
Immigration and Citizenship, ‘Minister Seeks to Strengthen Border Measures’ (Media Release, 11 May 
2006); Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 
(Cth) 2 [1]. 
7 Jane McAdam and Kate Purcell, ‘Refugee Protection in the Howard Years: Obstructing the Right to Seek 
Asylum’ (2008) 27 Australian Year Book of International Law 87, especially 93–103; Susan Kneebone 
and Sharon Pickering, ‘Australia, Indonesia and the Pacific Plan’ in Susan Kneebone and Felicity 
Rawlings-Sanaei (eds), New Regionalism and Asylum Seekers: Challenges Ahead (Berghahn Books, 
2007) 167; Susan Kneebone, ‘The Pacific Plan: The Provision of “Effective Protection”?’ (2006) 18 
International Journal of Refugee Law 696; Savitri Taylor, ‘The Pacific Solution or a Pacific Nightmare?: 
The Difference between Burden Shifting and Responsibility Sharing’ (2005) 6 Asian-Pacific Law and 
Policy Journal 1; Tara Magner, ‘A Less than “Pacific” Solution for Asylum Seekers in Australia’ (2004) 
16 International Journal of Refugee Law 53; Mary Crock, ‘In the Wake of the Tampa: Conflicting 
Visions of International Refugee Law in the Management of Refugee Flows’ (2003) 12 Pacific Rim & 
Policy Journal 49; Penelope Mathew, ‘Australian Refugee Protection in the Wake of the Tampa’ (2002) 
96 American Journal of International Law 661; Greg Fry, ‘The “Pacific Solution”?’ in William Maley et 
al (eds), Refugees and the Myth of the Borderless World (Research School of Pacific and Asian Studies, 
2002) 23. 
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status determination processes.8 However, the policy does more than provide a 
means of reclassifying ‘unauthorised’ boat arrivals such that they are excluded 
from an existing right to apply for asylum under Australian migration law. It also 
produces and relies upon very particular conceptions of Australia’s territorial 
border. The idea of excision brings the territorial border to the fore. It uses 
geographic redefinitions to achieve particular goals relating to national security, 
and in so doing produces multiple narratives about the role and nature of 
territorial borders. 
My argument is that the policy’s articulation of the role and function of the 
border relies upon and simultaneously undermines the logic of the securitisation 
of migration, which, crudely stated, is the discursive process by which the 
threats, misgivings and dangers facing the state are constructed as a direct 
consequence of the ‘problem’ of migration.9 Securitising discourses assume that 
the sensible response to this problem is to protect the state by restricting and 
controlling migration, to prevent the ‘outside’ from coming ‘inside’ and the 
central site for such control is the territorial border. Such discourses were at the 
centre of justifications for territorial excision, as an act of national security, 
limiting the access of ‘outsiders’ to the inside of the state. This is the case even 
though, as I argue in this article, excision undermines both the logic of 
territoriality and the construction of territorial borders as delimiting the safety of 
the state, upon which securitisation discourse relies. 
In order to explore these claims, this article is divided into four Parts. In Part 
II, I outline the literature that has described and critiqued the securitisation of 
migration. In Part III, I briefly outline the history of territorial excision in 
Australia and the broader legislative context in which the policy exists. Finally, 
in Part IV, I explore the constructions of the border within the parliamentary 
debates regarding territorial excision and argue that they exemplify the functions 
of the border as imagined within securitisation of migration discourses. I then 
turn to examine the effects of territorial excision on the physical geography and 
role of Australia’s borders, and maintain that contrary to securitisation narratives, 
the geography and rhetoric of excision constitutes a borderscape that undermines 
territorial conceptions of sovereignty, in order to limit unauthorised migrants’ 
access to the state and its protections. 
Onshore asylum seekers, particularly those arriving by boat, have been at the 
centre of political debate and discussion in Australia for well over a decade. 
                                                 
8 But, for notable exceptions, see Michelle Foster and Jason Pobjoy, ‘A Failed Case of Legal 
Exceptionalism? Refugee Status Determination in Australia’s “Excised” Territory’ (2011) 23 
International Journal of Refugee Law 583; Anne McNevin, ‘Border Policing and Sovereign Terrain: The 
Spatial Framing of Unwanted Migration in Melbourne and Australia’ (2010) 7 Globalizations 407; Alison 
Mountz, Seeking Asylum: Human Smuggling and Bureaucracy at the Border (University of Minnesota 
Press, 2010) 121–45; Prem Kumar Rajaram, ‘“Making Place”: The “Pacific Solution” and Australian 
Emplacement in the Pacific and on Refugee Bodies’ (2003) 24 Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography 
290. 
9 Didier Bigo, ‘Security and Immigration: Toward a Critique of the Governmentality of Unease’ (2002) 27 
(Issue 1 Supplement) Alternatives 63, 79–81. See also Sharon Pickering and Leanne Weber (eds), 
Borders, Mobility and Technologies of Control (Springer, 2006). 
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There has been agreement across Australia’s two major political parties that 
domestic policy should aim to minimise and deter the number of asylum seekers 
reaching Australia. Although the rationale for deterrence has varied, questions of 
national security and sovereign rights have featured consistently in policy debate 
that casts onshore asylum seekers as illegitimate refugees and as threats to the 
safety or integrity of the state. Territorial excision, and my discussion of it here, 
is best understood within this wider context.10 
 
II    TERRITORIAL BORDERS AND THE SECURITISATION  
OF MIGRATION 
That nation-states assert the right and the duty to control and manage their 
territorial borders is neither a new nor contentious observation.11 Borders have 
long been crucial sites from which the nation-state is narrated and constituted.12 
The discursive bases and content of the securitisation of migration also centre on 
constructions of the border and territoriality. In the securitised state, borders do 
not just denote the boundaries of the territorial state but are cast as key sites from 
which the safety and security of the nation can and should be guaranteed and 
protected. Governments present territorial borders and their regulation as central 
to national security, and preventing the arrival and potential arrival of 
undocumented migrants is in turn one of the key objectives of border control and 
protection.13 As a result, national security comes to mean controlling who enters 
the state and on what terms, rather than protecting citizens from obviously 
harmful acts. When governments discuss protecting borders by controlling who 
enters, they are not discussing the protection of the physical borders as such. 
Instead, it is the state and its inhabitants’ safety that is being secured and 
protected. It is this conception of ‘national security’ that I rely upon in Part IV 
when discussing the securitisation of the border. 
                                                 
10 For background, see Jane McAdam, ‘Australia and Asylum Seekers’ (2013) 25 International Journal of 
Refugee Law 435; see also Michael Grewcock, Border Crimes: Australia’s War on Illicit Migrants 
(Institute of Criminology Press, 2009). 
11 Scholars from a range of disciplines have pointed out that there is nothing new about the state’s 
preoccupation with the regulation of movement into its territories through border control and border 
management: see, eg, Ronen Shamir, ‘Without Borders? Notes on Globalization as a Mobility Regime’ 
(2005) 23 Sociological Theory 197, 209; Richard Devetak, ‘In Fear of Refugees: The Politics of Border 
Protection in Australia’ (2004) 8 International Journal of Human Rights 101, 103; Mike Grewcock, 
‘Irregular Migration, Identity and the State – The Challenge for Criminology’ (2003) 15 Current Issues in 
Criminal Justice 114, 121. See generally Mathias Albert, David Jacobson and Yosef Lapid (eds), 
Identities, Borders, Orders: Rethinking International Relations Theory (University of Minnesota Press, 
2001). 
12 For an account of some of the interdisciplinary insights of ‘border studies’ as a field of inquiry, see Jean-
Pierre Cassarino, ‘Approaching Borders and Frontiers: Notions and Implications’ (Research Report No 
2006/03, European University Institute, 2006). Cassarino notes that over the past decades, ‘border studies 
have become legion.’: at 1. 
13 Catherine Dauvergne, ‘Security and Migration Law in the Less Brave New World’ (2007) 16 Social & 
Legal Studies 533 (‘Security and Migration Law’). 
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The securitisation of migration relies upon a conception of the nation that is 
fundamentally territorial. It answers the confounding question of ‘what is the 
nation?’ by confidently locating the definition of nation on national territory, and 
delimiting this definition by reference to the geographical border. The nation and 
its borders are perceived as places that are geographically contained and singular, 
and still as places ‘of blood and soil’.14 Under the securitisation of migration, the 
successes and (abject) failures of complete control of all national borders are 
presented as the measure of the nation’s coherence, the safety of those who 
rightfully live within national territories, and a measure of the capability of the 
sovereign itself.15 
Sociologist Didier Bigo, who has extensively theorised and critiqued 
contemporary approaches to internal security in Europe, argues that the 
securitisation of migration depends upon the myth of the bounded sovereign state 
and on the idea that the integrity of the nation can be maintained by keeping the 
national ‘inside’ separate from the treacherous ‘outside’.16 This conception of the 
nation-state as a container, which serves to clearly differentiate one polity from 
another, orders national identity and security around concepts such as 
territoriality, geographical limits, entries, and exits17 – and it is this version of the 
nation that justifies the fortification and protection of state borders.18 
This explication of the securitisation of migration sits comfortably within a 
body of work that has identified the rhetorical twinning of national security 
objectives with strict(er) regulation of the border, and the now quotidian 
observation that a dominant response of Western governments to ‘terrorist’ 
threats has been the sweeping amendment of migration laws and border control 
practices.19 Measures implemented in the name of anti-terrorism and national 
                                                 
14  See generally Peter Fitzpatrick, Modernism and the Grounds of Law (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 
135, 129–36; see also Peter Fitzpatrick, ‘Globalisation and the Humanity of Rights’ (2000) 1 Law Social 
Justice and Global Development Journal <http://www2.warwick.ac.uk/fac/soc/law/elj/lgd/ 
 2000_1/fitzpatrick>. 
15 Catherine Dauvergne, Making People Illegal: What Globalization Means for Migration and the Law 
(Cambridge University Press, 2008) 169–70. 
16 Bigo, above n 9, 65. 
17 Ibid. 
18 Ibid 67. There is also a substantial literature within international relations tracking and critiquing 
processes of securitisation. Of particular note for this research is the extensive literature produced by the 
‘Copenhagen School’ of securitisation theory, coming out of the former Copenhagen Peace Research 
Institute. This work pursues, among other things, linguistic and critical discourse analysis methodologies 
to critique processes of securitisation. See, eg, Jef Huysmans, ‘Revisiting Copenhagen: Or, on the 
Creative Development of a Security Studies Agenda in Europe’ (1998) 4 European Journal of 
International Relations 479; Holger Stritzel, ‘Towards a Theory of Securitization: Copenhagen and 
Beyond’ (2007) 13 European Journal of International Relations 357. For an application of this work in 
the Australian context, see Matt McDonald, ‘Deliberation and Resecuritization: Australia, Asylum-
seekers and the Normative Limits of the Copenhagen School’ (2011) 46 Australian Journal of Political 
Science 281; and for an overview, see Michael C Williams, ‘Words, Images, Enemies: Securitization and 
International Politics’ (2003) 47 International Studies Quarterly 511. The author thanks an anonymous 
reviewer for highlighting this literature. 
19 Dauvergne, Security and Migration Law, above n 13, 533–4. Dauvergne catalogues some of these 
responses in detail, writing that: 
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security have routinely fixated on the outsider in the form of the migrant as the 
embodiment of danger. The migrant is presented as coming from outside even as 
‘counter-terrorism’ initiatives operate to deny basic procedural safeguards to 
those within the state and against ‘others’, who are citizens or residents or 
sanctioned as temporary visitors. This fixation on the territorial outside has been 
crucial in causing the edges of national territories (imagined as the only entry-
point of the non-citizen) and immigration issues to become increasingly 
prominent in political discourse.20 Ronen Shamir highlights the role played by 
the ‘war on terror’ in pairing border regulation with anti-terrorism efforts and 
national security.21 Proponents of the war on terror argue that the immigration 
system plays a crucial role in the local fight against terrorism as it is the key 
means by which the outsider is controlled and monitored. Under the logic of 
securitisation, ‘a well-functioning immigration system … deters, detects, and 
promptly removes those who lack a legitimate purpose for entering or staying in 
the country.’22 
As a consequence of the current securitised framework, the border has come 
to exist squarely at the centre of ‘the political’, as an imagined object around 
which interiorities and identities are created. 23  Contemporary discourses of 
national security and border protection are directed not simply at the exclusion of 
the unwanted other, but ‘also towards the production and regulation of political 
subjectivity within the polity. The border allows us to project a limit to the 
community and to create an “us”.’24 David Newman describes this particular 
function of the border, writing that ‘[t]he stronger the barrier function of the 
border … the more abstract the narrative of what is perceived as lying on the 
other side.’25 
Although borders are not new to narrations of the national, the extent to 
which the issue of migration is so routinely twinned with the security of the state 
                                                                                                                         
  The 2001 attacks were followed almost immediately by a crackdown on movement across American 
borders, which included contested measures such as a registration requirement for categories of immigrants 
living in the United States and heightened scrutiny of potential asylum seekers from predominantly 
Muslim states. The London bombings of the summer of 2005 had similar political results. … Within weeks 
of the July attacks, Prime Minister Blair had announced an intention to crack down on foreigners, even if 
amendments to the Human Rights Act were required: at 533–4 (citations omitted). 
20 See Audrey Macklin, ‘Borderline Security’ in Ronald J Daniels, Patrick Macklem and Kent Roach (eds), 
The Security of Freedom: Essays on Canada’s Anti-Terrorism Bill (University of Toronto Press, 2001) 
383; Ben Golder, Victoria Ridler and Illan Rua Wall, ‘Editors’ Introduction: “The Politics of the 
Border/The Borders of the Political”’ (2009) 20 Law and Critique 105; Didier Bigo, ‘Detention of 
Foreigners, States of Exception, and the Social Practices of Control of the Banopticon’ in Prem Kumar 
Rajaram and Carl Grundy-Warr (eds), Borderscapes: Hidden Geographies and Politics at Territory’s 
Edge (University of Minnesota Press, 2007) 3; Shamir, above n 11. 
21 Shamir, above n 11, 202. 
22 Ibid. See also Sharon Pickering, ‘Border Narratives: From Talking Security to Performing Borderlands’ 
in Sharon Pickering and Leanne Weber (eds), Borders, Mobility and Technologies of Control (Springer, 
2006) 45. 
23 Golder, Ridler and Wall, above n 20, 106. 
24 Ibid. 
25 David Newman, ‘On Borders and Power: A Theoretical Framework’ (2003) 18(1) Journal of 
Borderlands Studies 13, 20. 
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is a more recent development. The idea that sovereignty, by definition, entails 
that liberal democracies retain the right to control who enters their territory and 
on what terms they do so is one of the most widely accepted and commonly 
recited refrains of modern nation-states.26 However, the relationship between the 
border, the regulation of migration and national security no longer needs to be 
explained as it has come to exist as a form of common sense. Migration no longer 
only affects issues of national security; migration is an issue of national security. 
Under securitised migration systems, the need to protect the border from the 
‘foreign Other’ and the exteriorisation of threats persist27 despite ample evidence 
about the nature of ‘terrorist’ activity, which reveals borders cannot be sensibly 
deployed to define safety or to delineate who is apparently ‘with us’ or ‘against 
us’.28 There is glaring evidence that the constructed threat facing the state cannot 
be neatly explained by the presence of non-citizens or non-residents within the 
state’s territory. Those who do not legally ‘belong’ to the nation are constantly 
within national borders and those who do belong are constantly elsewhere. And 
yet, the border is still invoked time and time again as the principal site from 
which the security of the nation ought to be enforced. 29  The heightened 
surveillance now endured by those crossing borders is in part how the border 
becomes a site associated with crisis and fear. As Alison Mountz argues, locating 
security enforcement practices at the border has meant that security ‘crises’ are 
likely to transpire along the geographical margins of sovereign territory, ‘on 
islands, in airports, at sea, and in offshore detention centers where authorities and 
migrants encounter each other.’30 
Indeed, one of the consequences of the discursive conflation of migration and 
security is that the efficacy of migration regulations and the functioning of the 
                                                 
26 See Devetak, above n 11. John Howard, former Prime Minister of Australia, famously captured the 
essence of this principle during the 2001 federal election campaign when, in response to the arrival of 
onshore asylum seekers, he declared: ‘we will decide who comes to this country and the circumstances in 
which they come.’: John Howard, ‘Transcript of the Prime Minister’ (Speech delivered at the Federal 
Liberal Party campaign launch, Sydney, 28 October 2001). 
27 Macklin, above n 20, 392. 
28 Bigo, above n 20, 10. For a critique of territorial externality as the only basis upon which the nation 
classifies, governs and excludes, see Patricia Tuitt, ‘Refugees, Nations, Laws and the Territorialization of 
Violence’ in Peter Fitzpatrick and Patricia Tuitt (eds), Critical Beings: Law, Nation and the Global 
Subject (Ashgate, 2004) 37. See also, for an Australian example, Thomas v Mowbray (2007) 233 CLR 
307. In this case, a majority of the High Court accepted that the federal government’s constitutional 
‘defence power’ could be extended beyond war and external threats, to combat internal terrorist activities 
and threats. 
29 The externalisation of threat is regularly contradicted by the fact that those accused of so-called terrorist 
acts can and do come from within the territory of a country, as either citizens or residents: Macklin, above 
n 20, 392. Dauvergne similarly points out that high-profile terrorist attacks have generally not been 
committed by people who have evaded state scrutiny or who were in breach of any migration law 
provisions. She highlights the fact that the London bombers, responsible for the terrorist attacks in 
London in 2005, were citizens and that those involved in the September 11 terrorist attacks held visas for 
the United States, noting that planning such attacks as citizens is ‘a far better strategy than risk[ing] the 
heightened surveillance which accompanies asylum seeker status.’: Dauvergne, Security and Migration 
Law, above n 13, 543. 
30 Mountz, above n 8, xvii. 
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physical borders have become one of the key indices of sovereignty itself.31 
Catherine Dauvergne asserts that border control, migration and citizenship law 
have become ‘the last bastion of sovereignty’ since the capacity of national 
governments to control law and policy in so many other areas has been eroded by 
global forces.32 Consequently, ‘control efforts have been concentrated on those 
areas that remain, ostensibly, within the direct control of national lawmakers.’33 
These ‘areas’ are the spaces of national borders and ports, and migration policy 
determining who has permission to remain on sovereign territory and on what 
basis. 
These constructions of the purpose of border regulation assume that a well-
functioning sovereign can and must achieve full control over who crosses 
borders and on what basis, and that those who cross without authorisation are the 
embodiment of the threat to national security. The geography of securitisation 
discourse is attractively simple. It places the physical edge of the state at the 
centre of discussions about national security and constructs the inside of the 
border as safer and more secure than its outside. As a consequence, the physical 
space of the border is imagined as the fixed and singular site of migration, and 
therefore of danger. In Part IV, I argue that this flawed vision, of unauthorised 
migration control as national security, dominated both the construction and 
justification of territorial excision. 
 
III    AN OVERVIEW OF TERRITORIAL EXCISION  
IN AUSTRALIA 
In this short overview, I single out territorial excision – as opposed to the 
policies of offshore processing, mandatory detention and the naval interdiction of 
asylum seeker boats that have accompanied it. The purpose of this brief overview 
is to demonstrate that since 2001, the architecture and statutory regime of 
excision has remained steadfastly in place. At no point were the islands ‘un-
excised’. And most significantly, this has been the case while the precise 
consequences of excision and of an asylum seeker’s arrival at an ‘offshore entry 
place’ have been repeatedly and dramatically reformed and reformulated over 
excision’s long history. Then, in Part IV, I explore how securitised conceptions 
of the space and functions of the border have legitimised the pursuit of border 
protection and the exclusion of onshore asylum seekers, as geographical 
‘outsiders’ and threats to the state.34 I show that excision – alongside migration 
policies in a number of states that limit the entry of irregularly documented 
persons via geographical manipulations – has both relied upon and seriously 
                                                 
31 Dauvergne, Making People Illegal, above n 15. 
32 Ibid 169. 
33 Ibid. 
34 Jennifer Hyndman and Alison Mountz, ‘Another Brick in the Wall? Neo-Refoulement and the 
Externalization of Asylum by Australia and Europe’ (2008) 43 Government and Opposition 249, 260. 
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undermined the discourse of securitisation of migration, and its conception of 
territorial borders as sites determinative of safety or danger.35 
Over the course of 11 years, the policy of territorial excision expanded to a 
point where in 2012, all Australian territory was defined as being outside of the 
nation’s migration zone for the purposes of unauthorised maritime arrivals. The 
policy currently exists within a matrix of legislative provisions, the primary 
function of which is to exclude and deter people who arrive by boat without a valid 
visa and prevent them from accessing the statutory framework under which 
applications for a protection visa can be made.36 The exclusion of asylum seekers 
arriving by boat from Australia’s migration zone and their transfer offshore is one 
of the central means by which they are constructed as security threats and 
illegitimate refugee applicants.37 As Jennifer Hyndman and Alison Mountz point 
out, Australia practises an extensive geography of exclusion, via interdiction, 
detention and the externalisation (or offshoring) of asylum – of which territorial 
excision forms just one part.38 By detailing excision’s long history, this section 
demonstrates its enduring and central role within Australia’s broader geography of 
exclusion. 
Territorial excision was first introduced in late 2001. The policy was part of 
an extensive set of reforms that was presented as a ‘tightening up’ of Australia’s 
borders and a ‘crackdown’ on unauthorised migrants.39 The reforms were part of 
an ‘urgent government response’ to what were characterised as waves of boats 
                                                 
35 Ibid 249. 
36 See Migration Act ss 5AA (definition of an unauthorised maritime arrival), 46A (visa applications by 
unauthorised maritime arrivals). The question of the legality of the redefinition of sovereign territory 
under international law, although not the focus of this piece, has been considered in other contexts: see, 
eg, Alison Kesby, ‘The Shifting and Multiple Border and International Law’ (2007) 27 Oxford Journal of 
Legal Studies 101; Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, Parliament of Australia, 
Provisions of the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (2006) ch 3. For a 
general discussion of the duty of non-refoulement of refugee applicants who reach a state’s sovereign 
territory under international law, see Guy S Goodwin-Gill and Jane McAdam, The Refugee in 
International Law (Oxford University Press, 3rd ed, 2007); Sir Elihu Lauterpacht and Daniel Bethlehem, 
‘The Scope and Content of the Principle of Non-Refoulement: Opinion’ in Erika Feller, Volker Türk and 
Frances Nicholson (eds), Refugee Protection in International Law: UNHCR’s Global Consultations on 
International Protection (Cambridge University Press, 2003) 87. 
37 See, eg, Fiona H McKay, Samantha L Thomas and Susan Kneebone, ‘“It Would Be Okay if They Came 
through the Proper Channels”: Community Perceptions and Attitudes toward Asylum Seekers in 
Australia’ (2012) 25 Journal of Refugee Studies 113; Danielle Every and Martha Augoustinos, 
‘Constructions of Racism in the Australian Parliamentary Debates on Asylum Seekers’ (2007) 18 
Discourse & Society 411. For accounts of post-September 11 constructions of refugees as terrorists and 
direct security threats, see Savitri Taylor, ‘Guarding the Enemy from Oppression: Asylum-Seeker Rights 
Post-September 11’ (2002) 26 Melbourne University Law Review 396; Devetak, above 11. 
38 Hyndman and Mountz, above n 34, 260. As noted, the treatment of asylum seekers arriving by boat 
within excised territories, including various Australian governments’ policies of mandatory detention and 
offshore processing, has been carefully analysed and documented. For a selection of scholarship 
addressing these topics, see above n 7. 
39 See Australian Associated Press, ‘Howard Proposes Change to Australia’s Migration Zone’, 9 September 
2001; David Marr, ‘Outside the Law’, Sydney Morning Herald (Sydney), 15 September 2001, 51. 
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carrying smuggled migrants and heading towards Australia’s territorial waters.40 
One such boat was the Palapa 1, a small Indonesian fishing boat carrying 433 
would-be asylum seekers towards Australia in August 2001, which was rescued 
by a Norwegian freighter, the MV Tampa. The Australian government denied the 
MV Tampa permission to enter Australian waters and to dock at the Australian 
territory of Christmas Island.41 And then, in a move that attracted worldwide 
attention, Australian defence force personnel took control of the freighter before 
it was able to reach the island, disembarked its new passengers onto a naval 
carrier ship and set sail out of Australian waters.42 
On 26 September 2001, less than one month after the MV Tampa performed 
its rescue, and just over two weeks after the September 11 attacks in the United 
States, the Australian Parliament passed the policy of territorial excision under 
the Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Act 2001 (Cth).43 The 
speed with which the first round of excisions was passed (just eight days after the 
Bill’s introduction) is best understood in light of the panic sparked by the MV 
Tampa affair. The government presented its response to the MV Tampa as an act 
of national security, which was echoed in media reports of the event and reflected 
a broader narrative that characterised Australia’s maritime borders as under an 
extreme and constant threat.44 The arrival of six Indonesian smuggling boats in 
Australian waters in this period was characterised as a ‘loss of control’ of all 
                                                 
40 Andrew Clennell, ‘Politicians Join Forces to Squeeze Boat People: Destination Nauru’, Sydney Morning 
Herald (Sydney), 19 September 2001, 8. See especially Grewcock, Border Crimes, above n 10, ch 5. 
41 For a dispassionate account of these events see the judgment of North J in the habeas corpus action 
launched to try to prevent the Australian authorities from forcibly removing the MV Tampa from 
Australian waters: Victorian Council for Civil Liberties Inc v Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs (2001) 110 FCR 452. 
42 The Australian government managed to broker agreements whereby the asylum seekers on the Tampa 
would either be processed in New Zealand or Nauru and these agreements marked the beginning of the 
Pacific Solution: see Taylor, The Pacific Solution or a Pacific Nightmare?, above n 7. 
43 (‘Original Excision Act’). 
44 See Australian Associated Press, ‘Illegal Boat Arrivals a Pipeline for Terrorists – Reith’, 14 September 
2001; Tom Allard and Andrew Clennell, ‘Howard Links Terrorism to Boat People’, Sydney Morning 
Herald (Sydney), 8 November 2001, 6; David Tanner, Megan Saunders and Monica Videnieks, ‘352 
Illegals First of a New Wave’, The Australian (Sydney), 3 November 1999, 3; Brendan Nicholson, ‘3500 
Set to Enter Illegally’, The Sunday Age (Melbourne), 17 June 2001, 1; Kerry Taylor, ‘1500 Ready to Sail 
from Indonesia’, The Age (Melbourne), 31 August 2001, 6; Megan Saunders, ‘5000 New Illegals on the 
Way’, The Australian (Sydney), 31 August 2001, 1. See also Senate Select Committee on a Certain 
Maritime Incident, Parliament of Australia, A Certain Maritime Incident (2002) 2 [1.8]. For a meticulous 
account of the lengths the Australian government went to in order to prevent the freight ship docking on 
Australian territory, see David Marr and Marian Wilkinson, Dark Victory (Allen & Unwin, 2nd ed, 2004). 
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borders,45 and it was taken for granted that more and more boats were set to 
arrive.46 
The amendments made by the Original Excision Act were one part of a 
package of six Acts amending the Migration Act.47  They formed part of an 
‘integrated set of legislative and administrative measures,’ to deter irregular 
arrivals and protect Australia’s borders which included the introduction of 
offshore processing.48 With the original excision amendments came the creation 
of a new category of Australian territory, ‘excised offshore places’, defined as 
Australian islands and territories ‘removed from the Australian migration zone’ 
in certain circumstances.49 Any person without a valid visa (an ‘unlawful non-
citizen’),50 who first reached Australian territory at ‘an excised offshore place’ by 
sea was classified as an ‘offshore entry person’.51 
The key consequence of the Act was that ‘offshore entry persons’ were 
prevented from applying for a visa under Australia’s existing application 
process.52 ‘Offshore entry persons’ were also to be barred from access to existing 
independent administrative and judicial review of migration decisions. 53 
Crucially, ‘offshore entry persons’ could be transferred to third countries for 
processing and they were precluded from initiating legal proceedings against the 
government challenging their designation as ‘unlawful non-citizens’, their 
potential transfer offshore for processing and the lawfulness of detention.54 
                                                 
45 Robert Manne and David Corlett, ‘Sending Them Home: Refugees and the New Politics of Indifference’ 
(2004) 13 Quarterly Essay 1, 12–14. 
46  Ibid. See also Janet Phillips and Harriet Spinks, ‘Boat Arrivals in Australia since 1976’ (Research Paper, 
Parliamentary Library, Parliament of Australia, 2013). This government-produced document shows the 
number of unauthorised boats that have arrived in Australia each year since 1976: at 22–3. The years 
leading up to 2001 reveal both the unpredictable and irregular nature of annual boat arrivals and a 
significant increase in the number of unauthorised boats in this period as compared to the first half of the 
1990s: at 22–3. 
47 Including the Border Protection (Validation and Enforcement Powers) Act 2001 (Cth); Migration 
Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 (Cth); Migration 
Legislation Amendment Act (No 1) 2001 (Cth); Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 5) 2001 (Cth); 
Migration Legislation Amendment Act (No 6) 2001 (Cth). For comprehensive accounts of the law reform 
package that followed in the Tampa’s wake, see Mathew, above n 7; Crock, above n 7. 
48 Senate Select Committee on a Certain Maritime Incident, above n 44, 8–12 [1.39]–[1.58] (disruption and 
deterrence activities). These measures included the commencement of the offshore processing of boat 
arrivals via the Pacific Solution and a naval Coastwatch program with the mandate to detect, pursue, 
intercept and board boats carrying unauthorised arrivals on the high seas as well as in Australian 
territorial waters. For a thorough and detailed account of government policy dealing with asylum seekers 
arriving by boat in this period see McAdam and Purcell, above n 7, 93–109. 
49 The migration zone is defined as ‘the area consisting of the States, the Territories, Australian resource 
installations and Australian sea installations’ and also included Australia’s territorial waters: Migration 
Act s 5(1) (definition of ‘migration zone’). 
50 Migration Act s 14(1). 
51 Original Excision Act sch 1 item 3, inserting Migration Act s 5(1) (definition of ‘offshore entry person’). 
52 Original Excision Act sch 1 item 4, inserting Migration Act s 46A. Note, the terminology ‘offshore entry 
person’ was replaced with ‘unauthorised maritime arrival’ in 2013 by the Migration Amendment 
(Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 2013 (Cth). 
53 See Sue Harris Rimmer, Department of Parliamentary Services (Cth), Bills Digest, No 138 of 2005–06, 
22 May 2006. 
54 Migration Act ss 494AA(1)(b), (c), (e). 
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As a consequence of the reforms, the rights of irregularly documented 
arrivals are determined by the mode and location of their arrival. The bar on 
making visa applications for those arriving on excised territories by boat can only 
be lifted at the discretion of the Immigration Minister, if he or she considers that 
doing so would be in the public interest. Additionally, the bar on applications 
travels with the person, such that it remains in place even if the person leaves the 
excised territory and enters the migration zone at any later date. 55  The Act 
allowed for the future excision of additional areas by way of gazetted 
regulations, 56  providing a framework for all subsequent expansions of the 
policy.57 The language of territorial excision persisted up until the most recent 
round of reforms in 2013, even though, as I discuss in the following section, no 
territory was ever excised from Australia or its migration zone. 
Indeed, the history of excision from 2001 onwards is one of expansion and 
attempted expansion of the policy, such that it is now an entrenched part of 
Australia’s physical and legislative landscape governing irregular boat arrivals. 
The passing of the Original Excision Act marked the beginning of a series of 
attempts by the then conservative government to excise ever-larger tracts of 
Australian territory, as well as a number of legal challenges to the introduction of 
non-statutory offshore processing regimes attached to arriving on an excised 
territory. 58  Part IV argues that the policy did not and does not achieve a 
geographic excision of territory. The policy does, however, effectively excise 
judicial oversight from refugee determinations through excluding the statutory 
right to judicial review.59 It uses the redefinition of territory to create zones of 
legal exception, as well as to remove ordinary access to judicial oversight and 
                                                 
55 Migration Act ss 46A(2)–(3). 
56 Migration Act s 5(1) (definition of ‘excised offshore place’). 
57 Significant further excisions of other outlying islands occurred via regulation in 2005, which will be 
discussed below. See Migration Amendment Regulations 2005 (No 6) (Cth). For a timeline and overview 
of all excisions and attempted excisions until 2006, see Moira Coombs, Department of Parliamentary 
Services (Cth), Research Note, No 5 of 2005–06, 31 August 2005. 
58 See Coombs, above n 57. See especially, the High Court decision in Plaintiff M61/2010E v 
Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319, which found that procedural fairness requirements were not being 
met by the non-statutory processing regime that was established on Christmas Island and that the regime 
involved the exercise of a statutory power, despite the Commonwealth’s insistence to the contrary. See 
also the successful challenge to the government’s proposed return of unassessed asylum seekers to 
Malaysia in Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for Immigration and Citizenship (2011) 244 CLR 144 
(discussed at below n 68). 
59 Australian Human Rights Commission, Immigration Detention and Offshore Processing on Christmas 
Island: Report (2009). 
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Australia is certainly not alone in this use of the legislative redefinitions. 60 
Despite significant decisions of the High Court limiting the government’s 
offshore and non-statutory processing regimes, offshore arrivals’ access to 
statutory status determination and judicial oversight is still granted at the 
discretion of the Immigration Minister.61 
By 2005, the first proposed expansion of the policy was successful and 4891 
islands, forming a sizeable arc around the northern half of the continent, were 
designated as excised territories. 62  In May 2006, the Australian government 
proposed that, in the name of border control and national security, ‘designated 
unauthorised arrivals’ arriving anywhere on the Australian mainland would be 
treated as if they had landed in an excised place.63 The 2006 Bill did not pass into 
                                                 
60 See Kesby, above n 36 and the analysis there of R (European Roma Rights Centre) v Immigration Officer 
at Prague Airport [2005] 2 AC 1. See also Robert A Davidson, ‘Introduction: Spaces of Immigration 
“Prevention”: Interdiction and the Nonplace’ (2003) 33 (fall–winter) Diacritics 3, for a discussion of 
Amuur v France [1996] III Eur Court HR 826; Mountz, above n 8, for a close look at how a host of states, 
and Canada in particular, have rendered migrants ‘stateless by geographical design’: at 121. For a much 
earlier example, see Geoffrey Robertson, The Tyrannicide Brief: The Story of the Man Who Sent Charles 
I to the Scaffold (Chatto & Windus, 2005) 348–50. For a review and critique of the Guantanamo Bay 
detention camp as an exemplary site outside of law and legal oversight, see Fleur Johns, ‘Guantánamo 
Bay and the Annihilation of the Exception’ (2005) 16 European Journal of International Law 613. I am 
grateful to an anonymous reviewer for helping clarify this point. 
61 See Plaintiff M61/2010E v Commonwealth (2010) 243 CLR 319, at above n 58. For a look at earlier 
attempts to remove judicial oversight, see Mary Crock, ‘Judging Refugees: The Clash of Power and 
Institutions in the Development of Australian Refugee Law’ (2004) 26 Sydney Law Review 51. 
62 Migration Amendment Regulations 2005 (No 6) (Cth), inserting Migration Regulations 1994 (Cth) reg 
5.15C; Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, Parliament of Australia, Migration Zone 
Excision: An Examination of the Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection 
Measures) Bill 2002 and Related Matters (2002) 13 [2.34]. The first attempt to expand the excision zone 
was made via draft regulations in June 2002. Despite their bipartisan support, these regulations did not 
have the support required to pass the Australian Senate. The government then attempted to pass largely 
unmodified versions of these further excisions as Bills, rather than as regulations, in 2002 and 2003. After 
a further failed attempt to expand the excision zone by regulation in 2003, the amendments passed in 
2005. The failed Bills and regulations included: Migration Amendment Regulations (No 4) 2002 (Cth); 
Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002 (Cth); Migration 
Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill (No 2) 2002 (Cth); Migration 
Amendment Regulations (No 8) 2003 (Cth). 
63 Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (Cth). See also Senate Legal and 
Constitutional Legislation Committee, above n 36; Amanda Vanstone, ‘Minister Seeks to Strengthen 
Border Measures’ (Media Release, 11 May 2006); Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment 
(Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (Cth) 2 [1] (‘2006 Bill’). Note, the Bill did not replace the 
regime nominating certain places as ‘excised offshore places’ but extended this regime to include the 
mainland via regulation. It also changed the designation for those arriving by boat and subject to offshore 
processing from ‘offshore entry persons’ to ‘designated unauthorised arrivals’. Although the Government 
held a majority in both houses of Parliament, it withdrew the Bill just before it reached the Upper House 
of Parliament. The dissent of one Government senator in the Upper House, endorsed by a number of 
dissident party members in the Lower House, meant that the Bill would face certain defeat in the Senate: 
see ‘Howard Backs Down on Migration Law, as More Boatpeople Arrive’, Australian Associated Press, 
14 August 2006. 
2015 Over the Borderline: A Critical Inquiry into the Geography of Territorial Excision 
 
127
law. 64  Certainly, the Labor Party, then in Opposition, strongly opposed the 
mainland excision. However, when the Labor Government came into power the 
following year, it made clear that it remained fully committed to the architecture 
of excision as a ‘cornerstone’ of asylum policy. 65  It was certainly this 
commitment to excision’s architecture and its perceived ‘successes’ that paved 
the way for the Labor Government’s reintroduction of legislation extending the 
effects of excision to the mainland in 2013.66 
The successful reintroduction of the mainland excision in 2013 makes for a 
rather jolting lurch forward in this potted history of excision. The enduring nature 
of excision in the intervening years is highlighted by Michelle Foster and Jason 
Pobjoy’s conceptual framework of ‘excision and exile’, which describes 
Australia’s onshore asylum policy in this period. 67  For Foster and Pobjoy, 
excision (of Australian territory) and exile (of asylum seekers for processing to 
locations outside of Australia) explain the ‘mutually supporting’ features of 
Australia’s approach to onshore boat arrivals from 2001 until 2008. However, 
when the Labor Government was returned to power in 2008, it dismantled the 
Pacific Solution and third country processing, creating a regime of ‘excision 
                                                 
64 The justification for the 2006 Bill was that asylum seekers who manage to reach the mainland should not 
be advantaged or rewarded vis-a-vis those who reach excised territories. In 2006, however, the mainland 
excision proposal was sparked by the arrival of 43 West Papuan asylum seekers who reached Cape York 
(on the mainland) and the high-profile and significant diplomatic rift it caused between Australia and 
Indonesia at the time: Jewel Topsfield and Michael Gordon, ‘Vanstone Tries to Woo MPs over Strict 
Border Protection Policy’, The Age (Melbourne), 9 May 2006, 5. 
65 Chris Evans, ‘Refugee Policy under the Rudd Government – The First Year’ (Speech delivered at the 
Refugee Council of Australia AGM Forum, Sydney, 17 November 2008). 
66 Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 2013 (Cth). The 
mainland excision passed with comparatively little fanfare in May 2013. Though this is not to say the 
policy was not criticised: see, eg, UNHCR, UNHCR Statement: Migration Amendment (Unauthorised 
Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Bill 2012 (31 October 2012) 
<http://unhcr.org.au/unhcr/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=277:unhcr-statement-
migration-amendment-unauthorised-maritime-arrivals-and-other-measures-bill-2012&catid=35:news-a-
media&Itemid=63>. The statement notes that ‘UNHCR’s preferred position has always been for all 
asylum-seekers arriving into Australian territory, by whatever means, and wherever, to be given access to 
a full and efficient refugee status determination process in Australia.’: at 1. 
67 Foster and Pobjoy, above n 8, 586. The authors credit David Manne of the Refugee and Immigration 
Legal Centre for this formulation. 
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without exile’.68 From August 2012, however, ‘excision and exile’ once again 
become the backbone of government policy with the introduction of third-
country processing, dubbed as the Pacific Solution Mark II. This occurred as a 
result of the implementation of the recommendations of the Expert Panel on 
Asylum Seekers, a government-commissioned panel, charged with producing a 
report on ‘how best to prevent asylum seekers risking their lives by travelling to 
Australia by boat’.69 The Government presented the hastily convened Panel as a 
means to ‘break the deadlock’ between the major parties on asylum seekers. 
However the Panel is best understood as a ‘fence-breaking’ policy tool, which 
allowed the Labor Government to reintroduce a full regime of offshore 
processing, despite its previous, pre-election commitment to dismantling all 
offshore processing arrangements.70 
The necessarily final expansion of excision policy, to include asylum seekers 
who reached the mainland, was also implemented on the recommendation of the 
Expert Panel.71 The next Part explores the reasoning and justification for the 
policy’s various expansions and, in particular, highlights the absence in 2013 of 
the language of excision and a shift away from narratives about border protection 
and towards the imperative of ‘saving the lives’ of those travelling by boat. 
 
                                                 
68 Although an externalised and outsourced element was retained, with processing of boat arrivals intended 
to primarily take place on Christmas Island: Foster and Pobjoy, above n 8, 590. For an overview of the 
regime of processing on Christmas Island that was established in 2008, at the end of the first Pacific 
Solution, see Foster and Pobjoy, above n 8. See also Australian Human Rights Commission, above n 59. 
For a close analysis of the Labor Government’s attempts to put in place a new ‘regional solution’ prior to 
2012, including the failed 2011 proposal to engage in a ‘people swap’ with Malaysia whereby the 
government would accept 4000 ‘UNHCR accepted’ refugees from Malaysia in exchange for 800 onshore 
asylum seekers being sent to Malaysia for processing over four years, see Tamara Wood and Jane 
McAdam, ‘Australian Asylum Policy All at Sea: An Analysis of Plaintiff M70/2011 v Minister for 
Immigration and Citizenship and the Australia–Malaysia Arrangement’ (2012) 61 International and 
Comparative Law Quarterly 274; Michelle Foster, ‘The Implications of the Failed “Malaysian Solution”: 
The Australian High Court and Refugee Responsibility Sharing at International Law’ (2012) 13 
Melbourne Journal of International Law 1; Sara Dehm, ‘Sovereignty, Protection and the Limits to 
Regional Refugee Status Determination Arrangements’ (2012) 28(75) Merkourios: Utrecht Journal of 
International and European Law 53. 
69 Australian Government, Report of the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers (2012) 9. 
70 Indeed, although presented as a non-partisan ‘solution-finder’, the Panel was widely understood as a 
direct response to the Labor Government’s failures to secure sufficient support in Parliament to pass its 
‘regional solution’ of sending onshore boat arrivals to Malaysia in exchange for UNHCR-recognised 
refugees residing in Malaysia: see Wood and McAdam, above n 68; Foster, above n 68; BBC, Australia 
Asylum Panel Recommends Offshore Processing (13 August 2012) <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-
asia-19240306>. 
71 Recommendation 14 of the Panel’s report was to amend the Migration Act so that ‘arrival anywhere on 
Australia by irregular maritime means will not provide individuals with a different lawful status than 
those who arrive in an excised offshore place’: Australian Government, above n 69, 17. 
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IV    THE GEOGRAPHIES OF AUSTRALIA’S TERRITORIAL 
BORDER UNDER TERRITORIAL EXCISION 
The parliamentary debates and documents surrounding territorial excision in 
Australia feature two interrelated narratives about the border.72 The first narrative 
is one that presents the border as under constant threat and as a site of potential 
danger to the nation, which ought to be vigilantly protected and controlled. The 
second, connected claim is that the border is in a geographically fixed and stable 
place, and that it can be completely and uniformly controlled by a properly 
functioning sovereign state.73 In tracing these narratives, I argue the border and 
its imagined geography were shaped and determined by narratives of the border 
within the securitisation of migration discourse outlined in Part II. In this final 
Part, I set also narratives of the border against the effects of territorial excision on 
the physical spaces ordinarily inscribed as Australia’s territorial borders. 
Specifically, I interrogate the government’s use of the language and imagined 
geography of excision, and the Migration Act itself, in order to limit the rights of 
undocumented arrivals. In contrast to narratives of the border presented within 
the parliamentary debates, the policy of excision’s reconfiguring of Australia’s 
borders undermines the ideal of ‘border control’ and the very territoriality that 
the policy relies upon to contain and delimit the safety of the nation-state. The 
result is a legislative manipulation in order to exclude or excise a particular group 
of people from access to statutory rights, while presenting the policy as a 
manipulation of physical territory. 
 
A    Narrating a Securitised Territorial Border 
The first press release announcing the policy of excision in 2001 presented 
the border as a vulnerable site in need of constant protection. The release, entitled 
                                                 
72 I draw upon the parliamentary debates in the Lower and Upper Houses of Australia’s federal Parliament 
in relation to the following Acts and Bills: Original Excision Act; Migration Amendment (Excision from 
Migration Zone) (Consequential Provisions) Act 2001 (Cth); Migration Amendment Regulations (No 4) 
2002 (Cth) (disallowed by the Senate); Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection 
Measures) Bill 2002 (Cth); Migration Amendment Regulations (No 8) 2002 (Cth) (though note, these 
regulations were rescinded by the Migration Amendment Regulations (No 11) 2002 (Cth)); Migration 
Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill (No 2) 2002 (Cth); Migration 
Amendment Regulations (No 8) 2003 (Cth) (disallowed 24 November 2003); Migration Amendment 
Regulations (No 6) 2005 (Cth) (disallowed 6 October 2005); Migration Amendment (Designated 
Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (Cth); Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and 
Other Measures) Bill 2012 (Cth). Much of the recorded debate took place in relation to the proposed Bills 
rather than the regulations, hence the concentration on debates concerning the relevant Bills in the 
analysis that follows. 
73 In order to analyse constructions of the border with the relevant Parliamentary debates, I conducted key 
word searches of the following terms on each day excision policy was debated in either house of Federal 
Parliament: border, edge, coast, territory, security, protection and safety. Since my focus is on territorial 
borders as they are imagined in justification of the policy, I concentrate on the contributions of those who 
argued in favour of the policy’s implementation and on material rationalising the policy. I have also 
explored constructions of the border by those opposing the policy, and discuss contrary views where 
relevant. 
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‘Australia’s Border Integrity Strengthened by New Legislation’, stated that the 
intention of the reforms was to ‘ensure the effective control and management of 
Australia’s borders.’74 The Bills were described as reinforcing ‘the sovereign 
right of Australia to alone determine who could enter the country and in what 
manner.’ 75  The motifs of effective control, protection and sovereignty were 
central refrains throughout the excision debates; and the virtue of ‘protecting our 
borders’ was a source of agreement across almost all parties. 76  As then 
Opposition Senator Nick Bolkus put it, ‘[w]e have always protected our borders, 
and I believe we must always do this.’77 
It may seem trite to observe the prevalence of the rhetoric of protection and 
‘effective control’ within the excision debates and migration policy more 
generally. The apparent banality of this observation is a function of how the 
imperatives of controlling and protecting the border are accepted as common 
sense. Those debating the policy of excision did not challenge the convention of 
describing border regulation primarily as a project of protection and control. As 
one Opposition member of Parliament (who did not support excision) would 
have it, all Australians should get involved in the task of protecting Australia’s 
borders and the government should train ‘a nationwide team of coastguard 
volunteers’ and ‘[f]ishing vessel owners and other operators should be given 
incentives and opportunities to play a role in protecting our borders and their 
fellow Australians.’78 
The debates reveal that there was a set of orthodoxies attached to how the 
territorial border was described in relation to territorial excision. Both major 
political parties repeatedly outlined the virtues of protecting the border, with the 
Opposition in 2003 declaring that it remained ‘absolutely serious about 
protecting our borders’ and that excision was ‘viable and effective strategy to do 
exactly that’. 79  Even Andrew Bartlett, the member of a minority party who 
introduced disallowance motions each time a new piece of excision reform 
                                                 
74  Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, ‘Australia’s Border Integrity Strengthened by New 
Legislation’ (Press Release, MPS 164/2001, 26 September 2001). 
75 Ibid. 
76 Government member of Parliament Andrew Robb stated that the original round of excisions had proven 
to be an ‘outstanding success’: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 11 
May 2006, 8 (Andrew Robb, Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural 
Affairs), discussing the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (Cth). 
77 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 24 September 2001, 27 726 (Nick Bolkus), discussing 
the Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Bill 2001 (Cth). 
78 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 May 2003, 14 340 (Michelle 
O’Byrne), discussing the Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 
(No 2) 2002 (Cth). A strategy along these lines had already been put in place. Beyond the official navy 
patrols, the Senate Committee reported that ‘indigenous communities participate at a high level in a 
number of government related activities, including border protection and monitoring of illegal fishing 
activity’ and pass relevant information onto departmental officers: Senate Legal and Constitutional 
References Committee, above n 62, 97. 
79 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 May 2003, 14 340–1 (Michelle 
O’Byrne), discussing the Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 
(No 2) 2002 (Cth). 
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reached the Senate, agreed that the protection of borders was a ‘very 
sophisticated challenge’ that required ‘very sophisticated answers.’80 
This statement, similar to many others, manages to construct Australia’s 
territorial borders as at great, ongoing danger, but as simultaneously protectable 
by way of sovereign action and government policy, requiring an ‘absolutely 
serious’ policy response. The image of the border as physical place, which is 
locatable and permanently vulnerable, recurred throughout the debates. Members 
of Parliament referred to phantom media reports, signalling that thousands of 
people were waiting to come to Australia without authorisation, in order to 
confirm the risks facing the border. For instance, National Party Member of 
Parliament De-Anne Kelly warned, ‘[t]he reality is that Australia’s borders are 
under great stress and pressure. According to media reports, there are 5000 
potentially unauthorised arrivals waiting to come to Australia from Indonesia.’81 
The rhetoric of the securitised border relies upon narratives of the border as 
facing imminent danger from the ‘outside’, which can be effectively subdued by 
the sovereign’s complete control of the border. This narrative is at the very heart 
of securitisation of migration discourses and obscures a range of other ways in 
which border polices could be characterised. Sassen reminds us that governments 
could aim to ‘govern’ borders instead of controlling and protecting them. 
‘Governing’ is one way of describing the range of things governments do at 
territorial borders and airports, particularly when the immigration policy being 
implemented is not aimed at those already and categorically marked as ‘other’.82 
But, as Sassen notes, the rhetoric of governance certainly has not been the 
dominant border policy framework of most Western countries.83 
That contemporary borders are sites intimately linked with danger, the 
exigencies of national security and the legitimacy of the sovereign was frequently 
taken for granted during the excision debates. Some lone voices within the 
excision debates in Australia suggested a version of border regulation that 
involved efficiently processing or ‘managing’ those who cross borders, and 
which did not immediately invoke ideas of protection, security or control.84 The 
need for such comprehensive protection of the border was not described in 
relation to all border functions, but pertained to the deflection of unidentified 
                                                 
80 He did not agree, however, that asylum seekers were the source of border security threats: 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 18 August 2005, 45 (Andrew Bartlett), discussing the 
Migration Amendment Regulations (No 6) 2005 (Cth). 
81 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 September 2001, 30 968 (De-
Anne Kelly), discussing the Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Bill 2001 (Cth). 
82 Saskia Sassen, Migration Policy: From Control to Governance (12 July 2006) Open Democracy 
<http://www.opendemocracy.net/people-migrationeurope/militarising_borders_3735.jsp>. See also 
Saskia Sassen, Losing Control? Sovereignty in an Age of Globalization (Columbia University Press, 
1996). 
83 Sassen, Migration Policy: From Control to Governance, above n 82.  
84 Eg, in rejecting the further round of excisions in 2005 (though notably, not the original excisions), 
Opposition Senator Joe Ludwig claimed that Australians ‘all want a managed and fair system’ and went 
on to outline how a quick, fair and transparent processing regime would identify ‘[g]enuine refugees’: 
Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 18 August 2005, 31 (Joe Ludwig), discussing the 
Migration Amendment Regulations (No 6) 2005 (Cth). 
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vessels and unauthorised individuals approaching Australia via its territorial 
waters. As the Explanatory Memorandum accompanying the original excisions 
stated, the purpose of excision and border protection was ‘to prevent [unlawful 
non-citizens] from making a valid visa application simply on the basis of entering 
Australia at such a place or installation.’85 
Securitisation of migration identifies the way in which notions of control and 
protection are used to link the arrival of outsiders with threats to security, even if 
migrants are not themselves characterised as immediately dangerous or security 
threats. Security and safety are linked to border control, and those coming from 
outside undermine ‘protection’ of the state. Indeed, while members of Parliament 
were reluctant in the first rounds of excision to directly characterise asylum 
seekers as a threat to national security, this was done implicitly, as the following 
contribution reveals: 
The sovereignty of the country is very important. We naturally need to be vigilant 
in hard times such as this. We know, of course, about what happened in the United 
States only last week. People become far more aware of the matters involved in 
illegal immigration and the integrity of border issues when they see the sorts of 
unspeakable horrors which occurred in the United States.86 
Some members of Parliament made the link even more directly. Indeed, what 
was implicit in many discussions about the need to control the border was made 
explicit when security and the ‘protection of citizens’ were articulated: 
As a nation we have a sovereign right to protect our nation’s borders. Not only do 
we have a right; as a parliament we have a duty to protect our borders. We are also 
charged with the responsibility of protecting Australian citizens. This has been 
brought home forcefully, regretfully, by recent events in the United States. The 
reason we detain illegal immigrants is so that we can establish identity and check 
health, character and security issues.87 
The concomitant narrative of the border featured within the excision debates 
was a conception of the border as a permanently fixed place that could be 
completely controlled, whereby the government (and therefore the nation) could 
have complete oversight over who crosses borders and for what purpose. Senator 
                                                 
85 Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Bill 2001 (Cth) 2 [5]. 
86 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 September 2001, 30 955 (Con 
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87 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 19 September 2001, 30 983 (Geoff 
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Randall’s characterisation of Australia’s maritime borders exemplified this 
conception of faultless border control:88 
So Australia is a great destination for many people wanting to visit or migrate, but 
people do it in an orderly fashion, and that is one of the outstanding things that 
Australia can do. We can track the people who come here, we do know where they 
are and we do know when they are coming and going, which makes Australia 
unlike Britain and many other countries of Europe and the rest of the world ...89 
This quote is remarkable because it suggests that while some borders are too 
large and unwieldy to be controlled (since they are not bound by sea), Australia’s 
thousands of kilometres of coastline are in fact fixed, and therefore perfectly 
capable of being controlled. In a second reading speech in 2006, arguing in 
favour of the excision of the mainland, government member of Parliament 
Andrew Robb stated that the original round of excisions had proven to be an 
‘outstanding success.’90 He added that border protection needs to be continually 
maintained and that, ‘it is important that Australia continually review its policy 
and legislation in this critical area’ to ensure that that ‘proper arrangements are in 
place to deal with new developments.’91  These two declarations, that border 
protection policies are capable of ‘succeeding’, but that the act of protecting the 
border is a serious business that must be vigilantly enforced, represent a view of 
the border as a place that is at once entirely controllable and permanently 
vulnerable. 
The advantage of excision, as the government presented it, was that the 
policies prevented all those who do not belong to the nation from gaining access 
to the Australian mainland or the legal right to remain in Australia without the 
direct consent of the Immigration Minister. The Explanatory Memorandum of the 
original excision Bill explained the Bill’s purpose as preventing certain non-
citizens from applying for a visa ‘unless the Minister determines that it is in the 
public interest that such a person should be able to make a valid visa 
application.’92 In this sense, access to refugee status for asylum seekers involves 
the Minister or a delegate carefully scrutinising each and every application made 
by an undocumented boat arrival to enter the territory of the state. This image, of 
a government minister having personal (rather than delegated) oversight over 
every undocumented person allowed to remain within the state, exemplifies the 
                                                 
88 See also Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 August 2006, 117 (Peter 
Slipper), discussing the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (Cth): ‘We 
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89 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 August 2006, 28 (Don Randall), 
discussing the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (Cth) (emphasis 
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90 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 11 May 2006, 8 (Andrew Robb, 
Parliamentary Secretary to the Minister for Immigration and Multicultural Affairs), discussing the 
Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (Cth). 
91 Ibid. 
92 Explanatory Memorandum, Migration Amendment (Excision from Migration Zone) Bill 2001 (Cth) 2 [1]. 
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level of control over border crossings both imagined and sought after under 
securitisation of migration discourses. 
Indeed, when the Original Excision Act was first introduced into the Upper 
House of Federal Parliament in 2001, Government Senator Ian Campbell opened 
his second reading speech by stating that: 
The Australian public has a clear expectation that Australian sovereignty, 
including in the matter of entry of people to Australia, will be protected by this 
parliament and the government. The Australian public expects its government to 
exert control over our borders …93 
When the proposal to extend the effects of excision to the mainland re-
emerged in 2012, the Labor Government had abandoned its previous opposition 
to removing the entire mainland from Australia’s migration zone.94 When the Bill 
was introduced into Parliament, six years after the last attempt to excise the 
continent from itself, the justification for defining the mainland as an ‘excised 
offshore place’ had shifted away from a focus on borders as sites of threat and 
protection. Instead, the Government’s stated motivation was to reduce the 
number of asylum seekers dying at sea in their attempts to reach Australian 
territory, and to ensure that those who reached Australia did not gain an unfair 
advantage over other legitimate refugees by doing so.95  While both of these 
concerns were certainly present in the previous rounds of excisions, they were 
secondary to the rhetoric of border control, safety and security. Notably, both 
justificatory discourses share the ultimate goal of deterring the arrival of 
undocumented persons on Australian territory. 
In his second reading of the 2012 Bill that excised the mainland, Immigration 
Minister Chris Bowen cited the government’s intention to give ‘full effect’ to the 
Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers’ proposals, which recommended the mainland 
excision.96 The Minister stated that, ‘at the forefront of the panel’s reasoning in 
making this recommendation was the need to reduce any incentive for people to 
take even greater risks with their lives by seeking to reach the Australian 
mainland to avoid being subject to regional processing arrangements.’97  This 
reasoning for the mainland excision did not explicitly focus on the idea of 
securing the territorial border or its vulnerability.98 Though, at other times, the 
mainland excision was justified by the application of a ‘no advantage’ principle, 
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95 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 31 October 2012, 12 738 (Chris 
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Bowen, Minister for Immigration and Citizenship), discussing the Migration Amendment (Unauthorised 
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first articulated in the Expert Panel on Asylum Seekers’ Report.99 Under the ‘no 
advantage’ principle, the government sought to ensure ‘no benefit is gained [by 
maritime arrivals] through circumventing regular migration pathways’ and 
travelling to Australia by boat.100 Excision of the mainland was undertaken to 
ensure that all maritime arrivals would be subject to the ‘no advantage’ principle 
and regional processing, not just those reaching offshore islands.101 
The punitive ‘no advantage’ policy and the concern to ‘save lives’ were each 
presented as the main motivation for the policy. In the 2012 debates, the Labor 
Government shifted away from the language of ‘stopping the boats’ and 
deterrence to the need to create a ‘disincentive’ for those coming to Australia’s 
border by boat.102 This was not the case for the Liberal Party Opposition, which 
repeatedly claimed that the new policy was necessary, as the Government had 
‘lost control of Australia’s borders.’ 103  Liberal Party members mentioned 
variations on the phrase ‘stop the boats’ 15 times during the brief mainland 
excision debates. Though, it is also worth noting that the bulk of the Liberal 
Opposition’s contributions addressed Labor’s ‘policy backflip’, reminding the 
Labor Party that they had not supported the excision of the mainland in 2006 and 
had characterised the policy as ‘offending decency’, ‘lunatic’, and as ‘shameful 
and xenophobic’, among other things.104 
By contrast, in the 2012 debates, the Labor Government carefully avoided the 
language of excision and any kind of focus on the mainland’s borders as having 
been excised. As discussed in the following section, the amending legislation 
avoided classifying the mainland as an excised territory, but rather achieved its 
effect by extending the consequences of excision to persons arriving on the 
mainland by boat without authorisation. 105  As outlined above, one obvious 
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explanation for this is that the policy, following the Expert Panel Report, did 
represent a ‘backflip’ from the Labor Party’s extremely strong objection to the 
mainland excision when in Opposition in 2006. Additionally, as I argue in the 
following section, the controversy of excising the mainland on both occasions 
relates to the mainland’s border being imagined as the ‘singular’ border of border 
control, while the borders surrounding outlying islands are not. Another very 
influential factor in the presentation of the policy as a purportedly compassionate 
attempt to avoid deaths at sea – rather than as an explicit act of border control 
and deterrence – was the significant increase in the number of asylum seeker 
deaths at sea in the period prior to the reform.106 
The geography of the border in the excision debates was imagined as a fixed 
but potentially permeable site, which if regulated and controlled could be 
transformed into a place of near perfect control. The space of the border in these 
discussions was a site of both safety and danger. These constructions align neatly 
with the role and geography of the border as narrated within securitisation of 
migration discourse – namely, that territorial borders are physical sites of 
migration that ought to be protected and controlled since the ‘inside’ of the 
nation is safe and the ‘outside’, in the form of non-citizens and ‘others’, poses a 
threat which must be addressed by governments. This construction of the 
geography of security and the territorial border has been central to the rhetoric 
justifying territorial excision, and its role in affecting the exclusion of asylum 
seekers arriving by boat. However, an obvious contradiction arises when the 
rhetoric of territorial excision and the geographic redefinition of sovereign 
territory are deployed at the same time as various Australian governments have 
presented the space and physical fact of the state and its borders as crucial to 
national security. 
 
B    Excision as Undermining Securitised Narratives of the Border 
Despite securitisation’s attempts to tell a story of perfect control over stable 
borders, the need to ‘excise’ territory from the migration zone so as to 
successfully limit unauthorised arrivals’ access to rights under Australian law 
reveals that the immense spaces of the border lend themselves remarkably poorly 
to being completely controlled. Locating Australia’s territorial borders, both real 
and imagined, as a result of the policy of excision raises the question of how the 
excised territories ought to be characterised in relation to the nominally singular 
‘border’ and the sovereign state of Australia. On one view of the policy, the 
territorial edges of the excised territory still form the national border for some 
(authorised arrivals) but not for others (unauthorised arrivals), who can no longer 
enter Australia at all for the purposes of making a visa application. And yet, those 
who arrive on the excised territories are in Australia and under Australian 
sovereign control for all non-migration related purposes and have a status, as 
‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’, under Australian law. The border as constructed 
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by the law has, for some purposes, been removed completely and for other 
purposes remains at Australia’s territorial edge. 
In the parliamentary debates, the border of ‘border protection’ was narrated 
as being stable, consistent and in a fixed place. However, during the debates, 
substantial confusion arose when any attempt was actually made to define or 
describe the relationship between the ‘excision’ of territory and the space of 
Australia’s sovereign border.107 Australian governments’ ongoing decision to use 
the language of excision, removal, and rezoning in drafting and communicating 
the effects of the legislation is a central point of interest in thinking through the 
spaces of Australia’s maritime and territorial borders. The choice of the language 
of excision is of particular consequence because there were feasibly other 
legislative paths and alternative statutory language that could have been adopted 
to achieve the same substantive outcome as ‘territorial excision’ in regards to 
undocumented boat arrivals. 
The primary effect of the excision legislation is the suspension of specific 
provisions of the Migration Act for a certain class of people.108 The amendments 
affect the application of one part of one parliamentary Act and only apply to one 
category of arrivals.109 All of the other provisions of the Migration Act remain in 
full force on the excised territory, a fact that sits awkwardly with the phrase used 
in the original legislation’s subtitle: ‘Excision from Migration Zone’. As the then 
Immigration Minister clarified: ‘The provisions of the Migration Act continue to 
apply to these islands. The legislative changes made by this bill do not affect 
Australian sovereignty over these islands. The islands remain integral parts of 
Australia.’110 
Prior to the excision of the mainland in 2013, members of government stated 
throughout all the debates that the excised islands remained sovereign Australian 
territory. In 2003, the Immigration Minister insisted that, ‘[i]f other islands were 
excised, they would remain just as much part of Australia as they ever were, 
subject to the exercise of our sovereignty’.111 As the Explanatory Memorandum 
explains, the Act ‘does not affect the application of any other provisions of the 
Migration Act’ to unauthorised boat arrivals.112 
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Despite the above claims, that the islands most certainly remain ‘a part of 
Australia’, the government persistently used the language of excision and 
removal to describe the effect of the legislation on the excised territory’s 
relationship to the Australian ‘migration zone’. The use of the term ‘excision’, 
however, represents a mischaracterisation of the effects of the excision on the 
territory in question. The primary definition of excision is given as ‘[t]he action 
or process of cutting off or out (any part of the body).’113 Excision is defined in a 
figurative sense as ‘[t]he action of cutting off from existence; destruction; 
extirpation; the condition or state of being cut off.’114 If neither the islands, nor 
the mainland nor Australia’s sovereignty over these places have been cut away or 
removed, it is difficult to characterise the territory as having been excised, even if 
the particular statutory rights of a certain group of people arriving on the islands 
were revoked or destroyed. 
Significantly, entirely the same result could have been achieved if the 
particular provisions of the Migration Act allowing visa applications were 
described as being suspended or revoked within the confines of a designated area 
and in regards to a particular category of persons. Such an Act might have been 
named the ‘Migration Amendment (Suspension of Certain Provisions) Act’. Such 
a title, however, does not conjure the same explicit images of Australia’s border 
having been shifted, as inaccessible to outsiders and indeed as finally removed 
for the purposes of unauthorised arrivals, who would otherwise be understood as 
reaching sovereign territory. The Oxford English Dictionary’s fourth definition 
of excision is: ‘The action of cutting out or erasing (a passage from a book, a 
clause from a bill, etc.); an instance of the same.’ This definition could accurately 
describe the effect of the legislation insofar as one provision of the Migration Act 
was held to no longer apply. However, even then, the provision regarding visa 
applications was neither removed ‘from the migration zone’ nor from the 
Migration Act for all purposes, but only suspended in specific circumstances and 
for specific classes of persons. 
The statements made by members of Parliament, clarifying that the excision 
legislation did not entail the relinquishing of any part of Australia’s sovereign 
territory, were made in direct response to public concern and outright anxiety that 
Australia’s sovereign territory would be diminished as a consequence of the 
legislation. Such concerns were reported as coming especially from Australian 
citizens living on the islands themselves. 115  The confusion sparked by the 
legislation about the status of the islands in relation to Australia was voiced both 
inside and outside of Parliament. In 2002, the Immigration Minister 
acknowledged this and sought to allay such worries: 
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I know a lot of people do not understand what is involved. They hear about 
excision and say, ‘This part of Australia is being lost to us in some way.’ We 
know that that is not the case. It has not happened in relation to Christmas Island, 
it has not happened in relation to Cocos Island …116 
In response to these ‘public concerns’, members of government told 
Parliament that they had made several trips to the affected islands ‘to make it 
clear that the proposed changes will only affect people who arrive unlawfully.’117 
In a 2002 statement, which reveals the disjuncture between the effects of the 
legislation and the drafting language chosen by the government, a government-
produced digest said of the second round of excisions: 
Contrary to popular perception, press releases, the second reading speech and even 
its title, the Excision Act did not excise these territories from the migration zone. It 
provided that an ‘offshore entry person’… may not make a valid visa application 
while they are in Australia and while they remain an ‘unlawful non citizen’ …118 
Indeed, despite naming the original policy ‘excision from migration zone’, 
the government deemed it ‘plainly absurd’119 that anyone would think that the 
government had reduced ‘either Australian territory or Australia’s borders.’120 
And yet, the very naming of the first excision Bill as the ‘Migration Amendment 
(Excision from the Migration Zone) Bill’ and of the islands within the Bill as 
‘excised offshore places’ leads rather inexorably to the assumption that the 
territory had in some way been had been removed or at least separated from 
Australian territory. Indeed, in response such concerns, in 2005 the government 
produced a report entitled ‘Excising Australia: Are We Really Shrinking?’,121 
which explicitly sought to clarify that the legislation would not result in a loss of 
Australian territory.122 
The use of the word ‘excision’ in particular to narrate the effect of the 
legislation on the islands is not only inaccurate, it is also an especially dramatic 
                                                 
116 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 May 2003, 14 350 (Phillip 
Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs), discussing the Migration 
Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill (No 2) 2002 (Cth). 
117 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 14 May 2003, 14 353 (Phillip 
Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs), discussing the Migration 
Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill (No 2) 2002 (Cth). 
118 Nathan Hancock, Department of the Parliamentary Library (Cth), Bills Digest, No 176 of 2001–02, 25 
June 2002, 2 (emphasis in original). 
119 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 20 June 2002, 4018 (Phillip 
Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs), discussing the Migration 
Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002 (Cth). See also Commonwealth, 
Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 26 March 2003, 13 587 (Phillip Ruddock, Minister for 
Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs), discussing the Migration Legislation Amendment 
(Further Border Protection Measures) Bill (No 2) 2002 (Cth). 
120 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 20 June 2002, 4018 (Phillip 
Ruddock, Minister for Immigration and Multicultural and Indigenous Affairs), discussing the Migration 
Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002 (Cth). 
121 See Coombs, above n 57. 
122 The government’s original press release, which announced the policy, gave blatant airplay to the idea of 
removal and excision of the islands in question: Department of Immigration and Multicultural Affairs, 
above n 74. 
140 UNSW Law Journal Volume 38(1) 
 
and specialised term with which to describe the rhetorical subtraction of these 
territories from Australia’s migration zone. As noted above, the primary 
definition of excision is given as ‘the action or process of cutting off or out (any 
part of the body).’123 The word is often understood as a medical term, and related 
to surgical procedures, disease, and illness. Indeed, the Oxford Concise Medical 
Dictionary also lists excision among its pages. It defines to excise as ‘to cut out 
tissue, an organ, or a tumour from the body.’124 Under this definition, the nature 
of the removal to which excision refers is hardly equivocal or implicit. 
Associating the policy with a surgical extraction renders the excised territory 
both cancerous and malignant. The territory and its exposure act as metaphors for 
the unauthorised migration that happens in and around them: they are tumours, 
and the migration that occurs on them is irregular, hazardous and pathologised.125 
Here, the rhetorical excision of these spaces is presented as an appropriate and 
effective remedy. 
In light of the language chosen by the government, it is hardly surprising that 
the legislation was attended by a degree of confusion as to its effects. Nor is it 
surprising that the government was compelled to assuage members of the 
populace that they were not in fact surrendering the very sovereign territory they 
were seeking to defend. The alarmist response that was provoked by the passing 
of the excision legislation highlights that the geography of the border is 
ordinarily imagined as a place that is permanent, certain, and locatable. Yet, the 
debate regarding how the policy affected the geography of Australia’s sovereign 
borders demonstrates the manner in which the policy undermines the territorial 
nation-state and the central role of the physical border both in relation to national 
security and the securitisation of migration. 
Even accepting the government’s construction of the statute, which holds that 
its provisions do not result in any actual removal of territory, it is clear that a new 
‘zone’ has been created within Australian territory in which the meaning of 
crossing the border (if not the border itself) had certainly altered or shifted. As a 
result of the policy, the sites and functions of the border were manipulated and 
redefined to produce a deliberate duality within Australia’s borders. As a result 
of excision, one set of borders now exists for certain outsiders, namely those 
arriving by sea without the correct documentation, and another for insiders 
which, in this specific instance, includes more or less everyone else.126 In this 
sense, it is surely those people arriving by boat seeking asylum who have been 
excised from the state, and not the islands themselves. Further, as discussed in 
                                                 
123 Simpson and Weiner (eds), above n 113 (emphasis added). 
124 Elizabeth A Martin (ed), Oxford Concise Medical Dictionary (Oxford University Press, 8th ed, 2010) 262 
(definition of ‘excision’). 
125 See Fleur E Johns, ‘The Madness of Migration: Disquiet in the International Law Relating to Refugees’ 
(2004) 27 International Journal of Law and Psychiatry 587. 
126 See Kesby, above n 36. Kesby attends to the ways in which borders are multiple and shift in meaning 
from group to group. She argues that international law’s focus on the territorial border ‘may render 
invisible other borders which are significant for subaltern groups, and thereby fail to address the manner 
in which borders affect lives and determine outcomes.’: at 119.  
2015 Over the Borderline: A Critical Inquiry into the Geography of Territorial Excision 
 
141
Part III above, this excision is attended by an excision of the judiciary and 
administrative review bodies and their oversight of protection claims. 
Nothing demonstrates the multiplicity of the border as patently as the map 
produced by the federal government to illustrate the areas of excision after the 
second round of excisions were passed in 2005.127 The map was available in 
various reports regarding excision and was attached to a government-produced 
fact sheet on the issue, entitled ‘Australia’s Excised Offshore Places’. 128  It 
depicts a band of bright yellow delimited by a dark blue line arcing around the 
top of the country. The yellow section is described as the ‘area in which 
prescribed excised offshore places are located,’ and is unambiguously delineated 
from both the mainland and Australia’s territorial waters. 
Not only does the policy of excision and its attempted redefinition of space 
challenge the idea of the territorial state, whereby a straightforward mapping of 
territory determines the limits, safety and responsibilities of the nation-state.129 
The debates also created a hierarchy among multiple sovereign borders. Most 
notably, until the mainland of Australia was also excised, Australia’s mainland 
boundaries came to be understood as more profoundly the border than the ‘other’ 
borders surrounding Australia’s outlying islands. In the excision debates prior to 
2012, the mainland and its territorial edge were constructed and narrated as more 
legitimately and definitively ‘Australia’ than any of the island territories that also 
constitute Australia’s sovereign territory. This was most clear in the debates 
surrounding the proposal to excise Australia from itself in 2006. Here, those 
members of Parliament who had been perfectly untroubled by the original 
excision of territory in 2001 became ‘disgusted’, and even ‘utterly disgusted’,130 
by the idea that we would ‘excise Australia from Australia’ or ‘surrender our 
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borders’.131 The legislation was described as ‘profoundly disturbing’132 and as ‘so 
totally dumb and wrong.’133 
The disgust, as it was expressed, was not so much in reaction to the 
legislation barring all undocumented migrants arriving by boat from the right to 
make an application for asylum. Instead it was articulated as a sense of outrage 
that Australia would ‘abandon’ its mainland borders. Member of Parliament, 
Tony Burke, captured the sense of incredulity that accompanied the 2006 
proposal: ‘[a]nd finally we ended up with this, the most bizarre proposal of all: 
that border protection would be abolished and replaced with border abolition – 
that Australia would become a nation without a border.’134 
In making the above complaints in 2006, members of Parliament often made 
little or no reference to the previous excision Acts, which had surrendered the 
borders of 4891 territorial islands over the preceding four years. Equally, while 
Opposition parties had argued that the second round of excisions and the proposal 
to excise the mainland represented ‘a capitulation, a surrender’ of sovereign 
territory,135 the original excision of four islands in 2001 was more or less roundly 
accepted as a necessary component of Australia’s border control strategy. 
The lack of concern or care about the borders of the excised islands, 
demonstrated above, casts them as inferior to those of the mainland. This was 
equally the case for populated excised islands, such as Christmas and Cocos 
Islands, which are densely inhabited and established tourist destinations.136 During 
an inquiry into the second round of excisions, government ministers and 
departmental representatives not only admitted that they did not know the precise 
number of islands that fell within the original excision zones, but that they also did 
not know which, if any, of the islands were inhabited at all.137 In line with the 
attitudes of some members of Parliament to the significance of the excised islands, 
the scale of the map produced by the government depicting the effects of the 
                                                 
131 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 August 2006, 19, 20 (Simon 
Crean), discussing the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (Cth). As 
one member of Parliament responded: ‘You do not deal with boat arrivals by pretending that you do not 
have sea borders’: Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 August 2006, 
33 (Anthony Albanese), discussing the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 
2006 (Cth). 
132 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 10 August 2006, 7 (Bob McMullan), 
discussing the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (Cth). 
133 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 August 2006, 33 (Kim Beazley), 
discussing the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (Cth). See also the 
Dissenting Report of the Labor Party and Australian Greens Minority Report in the Senate inquiry into 
the Bill: Senate Legal and Constitutional Legislation Committee, above n 36. 
134 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, House of Representatives, 9 August 2006, 23 (Tony Burke), 
discussing the Migration Amendment (Designated Unauthorised Arrivals) Bill 2006 (Cth). 
135 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 9 December 2002, 7477 (Nick Sherry), discussing the 
Migration Legislation Amendment (Further Border Protection Measures) Bill 2002 (Cth). 
136 During public hearings about this further round of excisions, a representative from the Department of 
Immigration noted ‘an island could be anything from a sandbar to what we might think of as an island’: 
Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, above n 62, 13 [2.34]. 
137 Ibid. See also Commonwealth, Official Committee Hansard, Senate Legal and Constitutional References 
Committee, 6 August 2002. 
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excision legislation is such that only a handful of the islands located in the excised 
area are visible at all.138 For the most part, the yellow-shaded ‘excised’ area, strikes 
one as an uninterrupted seascape, devoid of any land. A few of the larger excised 
islands that do not lie in the yellow area are visible; they are shaded in pink and 
described as ‘[a]rea[s] in which an excised offshore place is located’.139 
Indeed, the excision of these islands and the offhand way in which they were 
referred to conveys something about their imagined geography. One imagines the 
islands to be far-flung, sparsely inhabited, or even completely deserted territories. 
At the very least, one could safely assume that the members of Parliament who 
confessed to having little sense of where these islands are and who inhabits these 
territories assume them to be insignificant and unrelated to the borders that are the 
subject of ‘border protection’ and securitisation. As a result, the islands become 
remote and distant from the territorial state; those who land on them do not 
endanger the nation or pass through to the ‘inside’ of the nation, since they are not 
on the mainland. However, as some members of Parliament highlighted, far from 
being distant specks on the horizon, a number of the 4891 excised islands are 
visible from the mainland or can be reached by foot at low tide.140 Labor Senator 
Sandra Kirk explained, ‘[s]ome of these thousands of islands are so close to the 
Australian mainland that they can be seen by the naked eye. In some cases, you can 
even walk to them.’ 141  Further, figures provided by the Australian Bureau of 
Statistics revealed that there was a total of 20 629 ‘usual residents’ living on 
excised territories when the first round of excisions occurred.142 
Significantly, the amending Act of 2012, which rendered those arriving by 
boat to the mainland subject to the same regime facing ‘offshore entry persons’, 
did not include the term excision in the title or the Act itself.143 Even more 
significantly, the amending Act did not add the mainland to the list of excised 
offshore places, which is how the policy was expanded on previous occasions.144 
In this sense, in a somewhat knotty piece of legislative reform, the mainland was 
not excised, but those arriving on the mainland would be treated in the same way 
as those arriving at excised offshore places. 
                                                 
138 See below, Appendix A. Another map, which is not attached to the fact sheet but is attached to one of the 
Senate Inquires into the further excisions, focuses on one area containing a number of excised islands. 
The map is entitled ‘Australia’s Maritime Zones in the Torres Strait’ and on a vastly different scale, 
shows more than a hundred islands speckled in just one small area of excision: Senate Legal and 
Constitutional References Committee, above n 62, 11. 
139 See Appendix A below. 
140 Commonwealth, Parliamentary Debates, Senate, 18 August 2005, 28 (Sandra Kirk), discussing the 
Migration Amendment Regulations (No 6) 2005 (Cth); Senate Legal and Constitutional References 
Committee, above n 62, 13.  
141 Commonwealth, above n 140. 
142 Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, above n 62, 13 [2.35]. 
143 Migration Amendment (Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 2013 (Cth). 
144 As noted, the amending Act made all maritime arrivals subject to the same regime, by setting out that 
‘unauthorised maritime arrivals’ landing at any Australian territory would be subject to the same 
conditions previously faced only by those arriving at ‘excised offshore places’: Migration Amendment 
(Unauthorised Maritime Arrivals and Other Measures) Act 2013 (Cth) sch 1 item 8, inserting Migration 
Act s 5AA. 
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The rhetorical casting out of the island territories in the previous rounds of 
excision demonstrates both the impossibility of locating the limits and 
consequences of sovereignty by simply identifying one geographically fixed and 
neat territorial border. The comparatively neat edge of Australia’s mainland is not 
Australia’s sole sovereign border. Instead, there is an uncertain and indeterminate 
line that traces the edge of the territorial waters around thousands of islands. The 
impossibility of actually achieving a timeless border or complete control over 
spaces inscribed as the border is demonstrated by the government’s decision to 
reconfigure the geography and legal meaning of Australia’s formal sovereign 
borders, including the mainland’s borders, so that they performed the work of 
exclusion that regulation of physical borders could not. The language and 
enactment of excision are an example of what Hyndman and Mountz describe as 
‘the respatialization of asylum’ in the name of ‘security’. 145  In choosing the 
language and regime of excision, the government readily sacrificed the territorial 
significance of reaching outlying islands and then the mainland itself in pursuit of 
perfect border control and a sense of national security. 
 
V    CONCLUSION 
Excision policy has had a significant and ongoing role in how the border and 
border protection are discussed and understood in Australia. In order to explore 
the conceptions of the territorial border that territorial excision and its 
justifications rely upon, this article has attended to the expansions and attempted 
expansions of the policy. My objective has been to interrogate how particular 
narrations of the border were used to justify the need for the policy, and its 
brazen redefinition of the consequences of ‘crossing’ into Australian territory for 
asylum seekers who arrive by boat without authorisation. 
In this article, I have argued that the enactment and endurance of territorial 
excision can be explained by discourses that have securitised migration and 
placed the physical geography of territorial borders and those who approach them 
at the centre of questions about the security and safety of the state. Territorial 
excision is not only a means to the end of excluding onshore asylum seekers. It 
should also be understood as attempting to secure a particular vision of the 
Australia border as ‘under control’, secure and directly linked to the safety and 
definition of the nation. The geography of ‘entry’ into Australia and its territorial 
borders, however, are not susceptible to the kind of perfect state ‘control’ and 
protection articulated in debates surrounding excision policy. In manipulating the 
terms of the Migration Act, the geography of the border, and redefining the 
implications of crossing borders, excision replaces the government’s inability to 
finally determine who enters the nation with a policy that allows the state to 
determine who is ‘in’ Australian territory for the purposes of access to the state 
and its protections. 
                                                 
145 Hyndman and Mountz, above n 34, 252. 
2015 Over the Borderline: A Critical Inquiry into the Geography of Territorial Excision 
 
145
In overriding the role of presence in Australian territory, excision undermines 
the very bases of securitisation of migration discourse, territoriality and their 
construction of physical borders as determining the boundaries of nation and to 
whom the Australian state has a responsibility. The act of excising territory 
concedes the fact that the physical spaces of the border cannot be controlled such 
that they are able to ‘secure’, define and finally delimit the territorial state. In 
order to perfectly exclude unauthorised (and unwanted) arrivals and asylum 
seekers, excision undermined the significance of crossing a physical border for 
certain people and redefined the implications of entering Australian territory. 
 
APPENDIX A: MARITIME BOUNDARIES AND APPLICATION  
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